Traitors to Rome? The Egyptian Garrison of the Gabiniani
- ptcrawford
- 2 minutes ago
- 8 min read
In the aftermath of the Battle of Pharsalus, Pompey’s flight from Greece across the Aegean to Cilicia and then to Egypt brings a peculiar Roman military detachment stationed there into focus: the Gabiniani.
They took their name from the man directly responsible for their situating in Egypt, the Syrian governor of 57-55BC, Aulus Gabinius. A firm supporter of Pompey, Gabinius had already had his name immortalised by being the tribune of the plebs who proposed the lex Gabinia, which gave Pompey substantial powers to prosecute the war against the pirates plaguing the Mediterranean. He had also served as a legate of Pompey during the Third Mithridatic War and made a demonstration march against the Parthian king in 65BC.
These Pompeian connections, along with some judicious spending and bribery, saw Gabinius achieve the consulship of 58BC (during which he aided in exiling Cicero), before taking up Syria as his proconsular province.
During his Syrian governorship, Gabinius oversaw the reinstatement of a Jewish High Priest, suppressed some local revolts, rebuilt towns and briefly intervened in a civil war in the Parthian Empire; however, this was all overshadowed by an opportunity that arose in Egypt.
Roman influence in Egypt had been growing steadily over the previous century, to the extent that when Ptolemy X required funds to reclaim the throne from his elder brother, he was required to make a will that essentially gave the Egyptian kingdom to Rome should Ptolemy X not have an heir.
As it was, the Ptolemaic dynasty managed to provide two successors, but the threat of Roman intervention and even annexation was now ever-present. This left the Ptolemies having to follow a pro-Roman policy, which included increasing amounts of money in gifts, bribes and maintenance costs for various Roman campaigns. Ptolemy XII in particular had to spent inordinate sums - to the point that he reputedly gave Pompey and Caesar the equivalent of the annual revenue of Egypt and had to then take out loans from Roman bankers.
Unsurprisingly, the bribery policy was unpopular in Egypt, with the increased taxation it required bringing about local level revolt; however, in the upper echelons, there was at least an understanding that this policy was maintaining Egypt’s territorial integrity. But in 58BC, the Romans unceremoniously annexed Ptolemaic Cyprus, demonstrating the failure of the numerous bribes.
This enraged the royal court, particularly when Ptolemy XII took no action against the annexation, leading to the deposition and exile of Ptolemy, with the throne taken over by his daughter Berenice IV. The deposed pharaoh fled for Rome, where he was housed and championed by Pompey. In this, Pompey was supported by the various bankers who had financed Ptolemy’s policy of bribery, as they recognised that they would not get their investment back if Ptolemy was not restored to the Egyptian throne.
However, the Senate could not be persuaded to intervene directly as the Sibylline Books prophecised calamity if Rome answered an Egyptian king’s call for help, while Egyptian envoys made their dislike of Ptolemy’s restoration known. However, Pompey did not let this senatorial reticence get in the way of his plans and he turned to his other ally in the east in order to facilitate Ptolemy XII’s restoration - Aulus Gabinius. He urged the Syrian governor to undertake the restoration without the consent of the Senate and in 55BC, Gabinius acquiesced.
Marching what must have been a sizeable force into Egypt, Gabinius defeated the Ptolemaic frontier army and then advanced across the Nile Delta facing little further opposition. Upon arriving at the palace of Alexandria, resistance collapsed and Ptolemy XII was restored as pharaoh.
Mark Antony served in this campaign as a cavalry officer, during which he later claimed to have met Cleopatra VII (teenaged daughter of Ptolemy XII) and reputedly played a role in convincing Gabinius to undertake the restoration.
Given the recent instability of Ptolemaic dynastic politics, Gabinius thought to leave a Roman garrison force behind. It consisted of 2,000 legionaries and 500 cavalry, including some Gallic and German horsemen. Not only is it to be said that the Gabiniani were there to protect Ptolemy XII’s reign, they were also there to protect Roman (and perhaps Gabinian) investments by making sure that the pharaoh followed pro-Roman policies and provided revenue and grain to the Roman state.
However, as they were stationed in a supposedly independent client state, these Gabiniani are technically not to be seen as a Roman garrison, but actually as a mercenary force being paid by Ptolemy XII.
This makes their position within the Roman state more than a little nebulous. Their very presence in Egypt was illegal from the beginning. Had they really been allowed to leave Roman service officially? They do seem to have retained their Roman citizenship and some connection to the Roman military as will be seen.
Regardless of their official standing, it is claimed that these Roman soldiers soon adopted the manners and customs of their host country, marrying Egyptian women and fathering children, essentially transferring their loyalty from the Roman to the Ptolemaic state.
Being a bodyguard for Ptolemy XII provided the Gabiniani with a prominent position in Ptolemaic dynastic politics. And an opportunity to intervene at the highest level came in 51BC. Upon the death of Ptolemy XII, his will stipulated that his two eldest children Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII were to rule jointly, making the people of Rome the executors of his will.
It appears that Cleopatra quickly made some move to sideline her brother in order to rule by herself. Initially, this appears to have been largely accepted by some of the Egyptian court and seemingly the Gabiniani too. However, this was to soon change...
In 50BC, the new Syrian governor, Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus sent a deputation made up of his two eldest sons to Egypt, possibly with the aim of encouraging the Gabiniani to return to Syria to take part on the ongoing war against the Parthians. This would suggest that the Gabiniani were still considered Roman soldiers and therefore under the purview of the Syrian governor. It may be that the Gabiniani did not want to return to the stricter discipline of Roman service, and so murdered Bibulus’ sons. It was also suggested that some rogue element – anti-Roman? Anti-Cleopatra? Pro-Ptolemy? – within the Ptolemaic court encouraged the murders.
Being a pro-Roman ruler, Cleopatra rounded up the Gabiniani responsible for the deaths and sent them to Bibulus for punishment. It was claimed by Valerius Maximus that the Syrian governor returned the accused to Egypt, stating that Cleopatra was interfering in their judgement, which was the prerogative of the Roman Senate (proving that the Gabiniani were still Roman citizens).
However, the logic of this notion has been questioned. Had Bibulus felt that he did not have the authority to judge the murderers, he would have sent the accused to Rome, rather than essentially releasing them to Egypt. Furthermore, he almost certainly did have the legal authority and the likelihood is that this story of Valerius Maximus is false, and that Bibulus did punish his sons’ killers.
But even if the perpetrators did not return to Alexandria, Cleopatra’s dispatching of the culprits to Syria caused a decisive rift between her and the Gabiniani. By the end of 50BC, supported by his guardians and advisors, Pothinus, Achillas and Theodotus, and now the Gabiniani, Ptolemy XIII had been reinstated as co-ruler with Cleopatra.
Early in 49BC, the eldest son of Pompey, Gnaeus Pompeius arrived in Egypt seeking aid against Julius Caesar. The co-rulers acquiesced, sending resources and the 500 Gabiniani horsemen to join Pompey. This time, the Gabiniani did not refuse to fight in Rome’s war.
When Roman attention falls upon Egypt with Pompey’s fleeing there in the aftermath of his defeat at Pharsalus, a significant change has taken place – the Gabiniani in alliance with Ptolemy XIII and his guardians had driven Cleopatra out of Alexandria. As Pompey arrived off the Egyptian coast, the forces of Ptolemy and Cleopatra were camped opposite each other near Pelusium, possibly setting up for a decisive contest. The arrival of the Roman civil war on Egyptian soil provided a brief lull in the Ptolemaic civil war.
And in that lull, the Ptolemaic guardians made what turned out to be the decisive move in their own and the Gabiniani’s defeat. Fearing that Pompey would be able to sway the Gabiniani who had fought under him in the past to join him in claiming control of Egypt, Pothinus, Achillas and Theodotus contrived the murder of the Roman general. Such was the integration of the Gabiniani into Ptolemaic society, it is considered unlikely that they would have defected to the defeated general. Indeed, two of their number, Lucius Septimius and Salvius, took part in the subsequent assassination of Pompey.
These actions against Cleopatra and Pompey and then their siding with Ptolemy XIII against Rome drew the ire of Julius Caesar, who is the source of much of the historical vitriol aimed at the Gabiniani.
They became the core of Ptolemy XIII’s army of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry that attacked Caesar’s 4,000 men in Alexandria through 48BC into 47BC. Caesar also claims (in something of a typical literary trope) that the Gabiniani also recruited large numbers of fugitives, criminals and exiles into their ranks.
Despite heavily outnumbering Caesar, the army of Ptolemy was unable to bring about a decisive victory before news that Caesarian allied reinforcements had captured Pelusium arrived in the spring of 47BC. The Ptolemaic army withdrew into the Nile Delta to confront these reinforcements, only for Caesar to chase after them.
Speedy advance and manoeuvres amongst the various waterways of the Delta allowed Caesar to join up with his reinforcements. Caesar was still outnumbered – perhaps 20,000 to 27,000 – but another important strategic development had gone unnoticed by the Egyptians: Caesar’s Gallic and German cavalry had crossed a strategic branch of the Nile. When the battle started, they suddenly appeared in the Egyptian rear, leading to a decisive Caesarian victory at the Battle of the Nile.
The exact movements or actions of the Gabiniani are not recorded, but as the core of Ptolemy’s army and the pharaohic bodyguard, they will have likely played a prominent role in the Egyptian formation. Indeed, as Roman soldiers and traitors in the eyes of Caesar, they may also have resisted the longest and perhaps seen significant casualties. Whatever state they were in post-Battle of the Nile, the Gabiniani were replaced as the garrison of Egypt by three reliable Caesarian legions, the XXVII, XXVIII and XXIX. Much like the Gabiniani, these legions were charged with not only protecting the pharaoh, in this case Cleopatra VII, but also with ensuring her continued loyalty to Rome.
But what happened to the man that the Gabiniani took their name from? Aulus Gabinius had taken a significant career chance in allowing himself to be talked into intervening in Egypt by Pompey and Mark Antony. It did not help Gabinius’ case that in his absence in Egypt, his Syrian province faced numerous attacks by raiders and a civil war in Judaea between candidates for High Priest. While Gabinius spent his last year as governor subduing these problems, when he returned to Rome, he was faced with charges of extortion, election irregularities and high treason. The combination of Pompey and Cicero managed to save Gabinius from the treason charge, but he was found guilty of extortion, with particular stress put to the large payment that Ptolemy XII gave him during the restoration campaign. This saw Gabinius exiled.
He would later be recalled during the Roman civil war, joining the Caesarian side, although he took no active part against Pompey himself. Serving in Illyricum, Gabinius squared off against some Dalmatian tribesmen and then later the Pompeian commander, Marcus Octavius, only to die in late 48/early 47BC of an illness. It would seem that Gabinius and the mercenary pharaohic guard he somewhat founded did not long outlast one another.
Bibliography
Bennett, C.J. ‘Cleopatra V Tryphæna and the Genealogy of the Later Ptolemies’, Ancient Society 28 (1997) 39–66
Roller, D.W. Cleopatra: A Biography. Oxford (2010)
Siani-Davies, M. ‘Ptolemy XII Auletes and the Romans’, Historia 46 (1997) 306–40.
Comments