Victory Through Defeat: The Battle of Avarayr 451 Part I - Background and Numbers

The kingdom of Armenia had been a persistent flashpoint for both the Roman and Persian empires. In the fifth century, it was no different, with the added dimension of religion being thrown in since Armenia officially converted to Christianity in 301. Its position came into the spotlight again in the aftermath of the Romano-Persian War of 421-422. It had been without a king since 420 when its Sassanid Persian ruler Shapur IV had made a play for the Persian throne on the death of his father, Yazdegerd I. That lack of a king had seen the Armenians eject many of the Persian garrisons and live in a state of anarchic independence for several years (Moses Khorenats’i III.56). When the Persian king Bahram V turned his attention to Armenia in 422, rather than install a member of his own family, he reinstated the ancient Arsacid dynasty (which had ruled Armenia, with some interruptions for over 400 years) one last time.

Bahram’s choice fell on Artaxias IV, a son and nephew of previous Arsacid rulers; however, he proved unpopular with some of the Armenia population, seemingly because he was fostering closer relations with the Romans. Constantinople had been looking to expand its influence into the part of Armenia under Persian suzerainty, with the fortification of the frontier city of Theodosiopolis, a move that may have been part of the catalyst for the Romano-Persian war of 421-422 – that city would be besieged by the Persians for 30 days, before they withdrew (Narratio de rebus Armeniae 4-9; cf. Moses Khorenats’i III.57-59; it must be said that the meagre sources are not clear on which Theodosiopolis was the target of Sassanid attack in 422: modern Erzurum or Ras al-Ayn, both in Turkey).

Another potential cause of this admittedly brief conflict was religious in nature. Shortly before his death, Yazdegerd I had initiated a persecution of Christians in retaliation for from Christian attacks on Zoroastrian temples in Persian territory. His successor, Bahram, had continued this persecution, with some Persian Christians fleeing to Roman territory and rousing the support of the patriarch of Constantinople.

So wary were they of the Romano-Arsacid association, their own loss of authority in the face of a restored monarchy and Artaxias’s personal weakness that a band of Armenian nobles appealed to Bahram to annex eastern Armenia as a Sassanid province. This was opposed by the Armenian Christian population, as they would rather have a poor Christian ruler in Artaxias than any kind of non-Christian. Despite this opposition, Bahram followed the request of the Armenian nobles and deposed the Arsacid dynast, annexing eastern Armenia as the newest satrapy of the Sassanid state under a Persian governor in 428 (Moses Khorenats’i III.64; Blockley (1992), 60-61).

Yazdgerd II

Initially, the Armenian nobles welcomed annexation, so long as they were largely left alone and allowed to practice Christianity; however, as already seen, the Persian government had shown a willingness to interfere in Armenian Christian affairs. Early in the reign of Bahram’s son and successor, Yazdegerd II (438-457), the Persians suffered some defeats against Asiatic tribes on his eastern frontier, with the new king seemingly blaming some of his Armenian and Iberian allies because they made up much of his cavalry. The Persian king may have imposed heavier taxation on the Armenians in response.

Like his predecessors, Yazdegerd also disliked the alignment of the Armenian Church with the Roman church, rather than the Persian Church of the East/East Syriac Church. Yazdegerd tried to compel the Armenian Church and some Armenian nobles to abandon that allegiance to the Roman church and join the Church of the East. The other option was conversion to Zoroastrianism. Such interference, on top of previous persecutory Persian meddling in Armenian Christian affairs, has seen Yazdegerd II viewed as a religious zealot and persecutor. And other religious minorities in the Persian state do seem to have suffered under his watch - Jews were prohibited from observing the Sabbath, the Jewish community in Isfahan attacked local Zoroastrian priests after the execution of some of their leaders, while 153,000 Assyrian Christians were reputedly massacred in Kirkuk, although this very much seems like an exaggeration (Certres, Donabed and Makko (2012), 258-259). But then for much of his reign, Yazdegerd’s attention was focused on the threat from the Asiatic tribes, so much of the pro-Zoroastrian zealotry carried out in his name may not have been directly ordered by him.

And in Armenia, it seems that much of the attempted imposition of Zoroastrianism stemmed from Mihr-Narseh, admittedly a leading noble in Yazdegerd’s court and hazarapet, something of an Minister of the Interior. Much of the Armenian nobility, many of whom were Christians, offered fealty to Yazdegerd in 449, only for the Persian king to summon the nobles to his court, where he forced them to convert to Zoroastrianism. An edict then imposed Zoroastrianism as the ‘official’ religion of Sassanid Armenia, leading to the demolishing of churches, building of fire-temples and establishing of Zoroastrian priests by force. It must be said that the Persians would not have introduced such a potentially divisive measure if they did not have some Zoroastrian support within Armenia. And in the face of such religious intervention, forcible conversion and even persecution, regardless if it came directly from the Persian king or from a zealous underling, much of the Armenian nobility, after repudiating their forced Zoroastrianism, found a third option to realignment or conversion – rebellion.

Vardan Mamikonian

Those Armenian Christians willing to fight for their faith found leadership from the prominent noble Vardan Mamikonian, sparapet of Armenia, a supreme military command held hereditarily by the Mamikonian family even after the abolition of the Armenian kingdom in 428. In this role, Vardan had led the Armenian cavalry that Yazdegerd blamed for his defeat by the Asiatic tribes, while his position as a leading noble saw him as one of those forced to convert to Zoroastrianism by the Persian king, only to immediately repudiate it upon returning home and raising the standard of rebellion (some versions of the story, perhaps influenced by the religious, indeed sanctified, importance Vardan was to take on, have it that Vardan chose exile over apostasy, only to return to lead the rebellion).

Looking to take advantage of the Persian distraction with their eastern frontier – the Armenian nobles may only have been released by Yazdegerd following the latest Asiatic attack on Persian territory, Vardan and his allies attacked various Persian garrisons in Armenian, capturing several fortresses and settlements and perhaps even penetrating into the neighbouring Persian satrapy of Media Atropatene.

With this initial success, the Armenian rebels reached out to various potential allies in their fight with the Persians. This managed to bring about an alliance with some of the Hunnic tribes raiding the Persian eastern frontier, although those Asiatic tribes were already doing as much as they could to help the Armenians. An embassy to Constantinople did not achieve anything much either, likely due to the Roman distractions with the death of Theodosius II, the Council of Chalcedon and their own Hunnic problems. Perhaps the most important result of this search for allies came from Caucasian Albania.

Some of its leaders had been similarly pressured by the government of Yazdegerd over their Christian faith. Therefore, with an incipient Armenian revolt over the border, these Albanians seem to have pointed Vardan in the direction of the Persian forces situated in Albania itself, which may have had orders to impose Zoroastrianism on the Albanians by force. The Armenian rebels decided to intervene in Albania in the hope of both securing their own northern frontier and gaining aid from a Christian Caucasian Albania. Having gathered all their forces, the rebels divided them into three armies – one under Nershapuh Rmbosean was to defend the frontier with Atropatene, the second under Vardan was to march into Albania to confront the Persian forces there under Sebukht, the marzban of Chor/Derbent, while the third under the marzban Vasak Siwni was stationed in Armenia in a position to support with Vardan or Nershapuh. Instead, Vasak quickly proved that either his repudiation of Zoroastrianism had not been sincere or that Yazdegerd’s holding of his family hostage was a stronger influence on him that his faith or the freedom of his nation.

Having surrounded himself with men less fervent in their Christian religion or nationalism, Vasak wrote to Sebukht, informing him of the rebel plans and encouraging him to attack Vardan’s small force before it could raise support amongst the Albanians. So fast was Vasak’s betrayal and Sebukht’s acting on it that the marzban’s army in Albania managed to cross the Kura into Armenia and deploy for battle on the plain near the city of Xalxal, the winter residence of the kings of Albania north of Lake Sevan (Elishe 75).

The resultant Battle of Xalxal would seem likely to have only gone one way with the Persians lying in wait for an unaware Vardan’s small force; however, this was not a trap, so when the Armenians arrived on the plain, they were able to take stock of the situation and decide whether to fight or not. Armenian sources like Elishe present the subsequent decision to attack against supposedly overwhelming odds as relying on prayers for divine aid; however, instead, we might view the Battle of Xalxal in less sensational, more realistic terms. Rather than a vast Persian army just returned from fighting the Huns, Sebukht’s force was likely much smaller, probably made up of garrison forces stationed in Albania, plus some Albanians in Persian service. Indeed, the fact that Sebukht deployed in wait for the Armenians could even suggest that he required topography to be on his side, meaning that the armies at Xalxal were of similar size. This would have it that Vardan’s choice to attack at Xalal was not some desperate move relying on divine intervention, but a taking advantage of a more level playing field.

Whatever the circumstances leading up to the battle, Vardan and his forces deployed in closed ranks (although even that action might be influenced by 2 Macc. 12:15) and charged the Persian army. This attack broke the Persian right wing, driving it into the Persian left, leading to a general rout. A Persian remnant held out in the forests north of Lake Sevan, only to be swept into the waters of the nearby Lop’nos river by another Armenian attack. Seemingly few of Sebukht’s army managed to escape (Elishe 76).

Vardan’s men plundered Sebukht’s abandoned camp and then moved on to attack and capture various strongholds that had been held by Persians in Albania, killing numerous Zoroastrian priests sent to convert the Albanians (Elishe 77). These successes saw many Christian Albanians join the Armenian rebels and together they marched north to the Derbent Pass, where the defeated the Persian force guarding it, likely left behind by Sebukht when he marched south against Vardan (Elishe 78).

Whilst revelling in these victories, the Armenian rebels were informed of the open defection of Vasak, who was ransacking much of Armenia in their absence. Upon hearing of Vardan’s successes in Albania and Nershapuh’s move to challenge his raiding, Vasak withdrew to his own lands, only for the Christian Armenian rebels to follow and raid those lands (Elishe 81).

Initially, in the wake of the successes of Vardan and the Armenian rebels and another reverse at the hands of the Asiatic tribes in the east, Yazdegerd II seems to have been willing to allow the Armenians to live as Christians; however, this was considered an intentional delay in order to give the Persians time to figure out if the Romans were willing to intervene in favour of the Armenian and Albanian Christians. And when Yazdegerd found that the new emperor Marcian was unwilling to intervene in Caucasian religious politics, he immediately went back to his plan to forcibly convert the area to Zoroastrianism (Elishe 86).

The Armenian rebels had not been deceived by the Persian king’s profession of peace and tolerance and when Yazdegerd realised that he had made no in-roads in undermining the coalition of Armenian Christians, he ordered Mihr-Narseh to mobilise a vast army, who “gathered under his command troops from every land and sent with him many companies of elephants” (Elishe 88). Mihr-Narseh advanced on Paytakaran, a town between the Kura and Araxes rivers and within striking distance of both Armenia and Albania. From there, he summoned Vasak, who he infers could be appointed king of Armenia should he defeat the rebels and facilitate Persian attempts to spread Zoroastrianism (Elishe 90).

Vasak used bluff and subterfuge in an attempt to undermine the unity of the Armenian rebels and hinder Albanian aid to Vardan, with Elishe 93-94 even suggesting that he deceived the Romans into thinking that he was the representative of the Christian Armenians. These machinations of Vasak and the financial and military power available to Mihr-Narseh seems to have succeeded in undermining some aspects of the Armenian-Albanian alliance and even the covenant between the Armenian Christians.

And yet, Elishe 96 still has Vasak report to Mihr-Narseh that Vardan was able to field an army of 60,000! This number may have scared Mihr-Narseh into not leading the army himself, delegating that role to two other nobles, Muskhan Niusalavurt and Dolvech, before then returning to the court of Yazdegerd to present a report on the success he and Vasak had had in undermining the revolt. And when Vardan mustered all the Armenian forces at Artashat, it seemingly topped the reports that Vasak gave the Persians, gathering 66,000 infantry and cavalry!

While lacking Roman support, Vardan had allies from the Albanians and Huns north of the Caucasus, as well as a noble core of veterans and well-respected Armenian heavy cavalry. The religious element of the revolt may have encouraged far more Christian peasants from Armenia and various other surrounding regions to join up, swelling the numbers if not the quality of Vardan’s army, but it is unlikely to have reached the recorded 66,000.

Similar inflation of numbers is seen with the Persian army that was to fight at Avarayr. Armenian sources present the royal force on a scale barely matched until the Industrial Age - 200-300,000 men (Babessian (1965), 16-19). While the Persian king was capable of recruiting forces in the several tens of thousands from within his own realm and he still had allies amongst the Zoroastrian Caucasians including what was recorded as 40-60,000 Armenians, he was in no position to field an army of 300,000. Furthermore, this Persian force at Avarayr was more likely a regional force rather than the grand army of the King of Kings. That said, the Sassanid force did include corps of elephants, Vasak’s Armenians, allied contingents from the Albanians and Huns, and perhaps some of their own fearsome elite cavalry, the Immortals. It was not going to be a pushover.

Despite the wide array of regions, petty kingdoms and peoples represented at Avarayr, such overall numbers – perhaps over 400,000 men – are impossible. That there was no direct involvement from either the Persian king or the Roman emperor significantly reduces the possibility of the combined armies even reaching 30-40,000. The sceptic might be tempted to apply the ‘rule of 10’ to the numbers at Avarayr, suggesting that the Armenians were closer to 6,000 and the Persians closer to 20,000. Even such heavily reduced numbers would suggest that the Armenians and their allies would face a considerable challenge when the two armies squared up to one another...