In the early years of the reign of the Egyptian pharaoh Ramesses III (c.1186-1155BC), a storm broke on the coastline of the eastern Mediterranean. This was the attack of the enigmatic Sea Peoples.
While it might be thought that this devastating attack on Near Eastern civilisation came out of the blue, it is possible that the attack that occurred during the reign of Ramesses III (c.1186-1155BC) was in fact the third wave of such destruction. The narratives of previous pharaohs, Ramesses II (c.1279-1213BC) and his son Merneptah (c.1213-1203BC), record similar attacks from similarly named enemies (although not all were connected with the sea).
It does seem that the threat of the Sea Peoples (and others such as the militaristic Middle Assyrian kingdom) had been felt already and was expected again, as the 13th century BC had seen a substantial change in Near Eastern politics. In 1274BC, the two main powers in the eastern Mediterranean, the Egyptians and the Hittites had squared off against one other at the Battle of Kadesh (1274BC) with hegemony of the Middle East seemingly at stake. The battle itself, while shifting one way and then the other, was ultimately inconclusive. Certainly, there was a lack of a decisive victor and hostilities continued for at least another 16 years, before some kind of treaty was signed between Ramesses II and the Hittite king, Hattusili III. While not necessarily marking the end of Egyptian-Hittite enmity or even hostilities, it was a major point along a decades-long path that took these two states from military enemies to military allies.
In the face of the Sea People threat, the Egyptians and Hittites seem to have felt that help one another was the better course, with the former sending the latter grain to bolster their stores in case of siege and the latter providing warriors for the Egyptian army. Merneptah is also recording bolstering the defences of Ugarit (modern Ras Shamra, near Latakia), the northern-most of a series of Lebanese and Syrian ports that 13th century BC Egypt maintained a significant trading presence. Although given its northerly position, it is not surprising to see Ugarit host a similar Hittite presence and even owe tribute and fealty to the Hittite king. Ugarit may even have been subsumed by the Hittite kingdom at some point.
By the early 12th century BC, Ugarit’s best days were perhaps two centuries behind her, but even by that point those days had been long and prosperous. The site of Ugarit had been fortified perhaps as early as 6000BC, with settlement coming even before that. Its position as a port on the Mediterranean that also had access to the overland routes to the great rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates gave Ugarit much of its importance. She also had her own diplomatic and trading relations with other neighbours, including Cyprus and Mycenaean Greece, so any control by either the Egyptians or Hittites likely waxed and waned over numerous decades and even centuries. Indeed, through much of the 2nd millennium BC Ugarit was an independent kingdom to itself, possibly not just to be seen as a gateway between Mediterranean and Mesopotamian trade, but also as something of a buffer state and place of interaction between the Hittite and Egyptian empires.
And even with any decline in her trading output, Ugarit was still considered of enough importance for the Egyptians to have a presence there by the 13th century BC, for there to be correspondence sent by Ugarit royals to Egyptian pharaohs and queens in the Amarna Letters (EA#45-49) and for Merneptah to make the aforementioned defensive improvements. Unfortunately, these improvements to Ugarit’s defences did little to protect it in the face of the threat of the rampaging Sea Peoples.
Ugarit appears to have called for aid from its allies and neighbours, including to the Hittite governor of Carchemish, who was warned “Ships of the enemy have been seen at sea!”. The letter to Carchemish must also have contained some idea that Ugarit was lacking its own defensive manpower close at hand, for in his reply, the Hittite governor asked “where are your troops, your chariots stationed? Are they not stationed near you?” He then gives some solid if unspectacular advice “Well, you must remain firm... Surround your cities with walls. Bring (your) infantry and chariotry into (them). Be on the lookout for the enemy and make yourself very strong!” (RS L 1 (Ugaritica V.23); Cline (2014), 150; Singer (1999), 728; Bryce (2005) 334)
The answer to this question of “where were the Ugarit forces?” at a time of such military threat seems to come in another letter. The Ugarit king had not only sent a similar letter to Alashiya (Cyprus) as he had done to Carchemish, he also received a similar reply asking where his own forces were (or a Cypriot plea for assistance). RS 18.147 (Nougayrol et al. (1968) Ugaritica V.87-89 no.24) has the Ugarit king, Ammurapi, explaining to the ruler of Alashiya that not only has the Ugarit hinterland already been ravaged by the Sea Peoples, but that his ships and armies were fighting alongside the Hittites both in Hittite territory and in ‘Lukka’, seemingly antique Lycia in modern south-western Turkey, either defending against Sea People attacks or aiding the Hittites in their attempted subjugation of Lukka. It is quite possible that Ammurapi was answering a direct plea from the Hittite king, Suppiluliuma II: “The enemy [advances(?)] against us and there is no number [...]. Our number is pure(?) [...] Whatever is available, look for it and send it to me.” (Ashtour (1965) 256). It would seem that at its time of greatest need, Ugarit had sent the cream of its forces to help defend or attack someone else’s territory...
Another reply to the Ugaritic call for aid from Eshuwaru, senior governor of Alashiya, raises a rather interesting notion about some of these ‘Sea Peoples’, or at the very least highlight how the lack of understanding about who they were could lead to some paranoia and mutual recrimination.
As for the matter concerning those enemies: (it was) the people from your country (and) your own ships (who) did this! And (it was) the people from your country (who) committed these transgression(s)...I am writing to inform you and protect you. Be aware! (RS 20.18 (Ugaritica V.22); Bryce (2005) 334; Singer (1999) 721; Cline (2014) 151).
Not only does this suggest that the Alashiya governor is blaming the Ugarit army for the raids, it also contains something of an undercurrent that the Ugarit king has hinted or even outright accused Alashiya of being behind some of the ‘Sea People’ raids.
While the chaos caused by the Sea Peoples might have raised paranoia and accusations, it did not stop some of the allies attempting to aid one another. We have already seen Ugarit providing military aid to the Hittites (to their detriment) and perhaps in response to that aid as well as Ugarit pleas, Carchemish claimed to have sent military aid to Ugarit and urged the city leaders to hold out as long as possible (RS 88.2009; Malbran-Labat in Yon and Arnaud (2001) 249-50; Singer (1999) 729; Cline (2014) 151).
Ammurapi also had an epistolary plea for aid written to Alashiya decrying how “the enemy ships are already here, they have set fire to my towns and have done very great damage in the countryside” (RS 20.238). Indeed, so close at hand were the invaders that “the clay tablet bearing the king’s letter was never sent. It was found, still in the kiln where it was being fired, amid the rubble of the devastated city, a vivid first-hand account penned on the eve of destruction” (Wilkinson (2010) 351). This also proves that the forces of Carchemish either did not arrive or were insufficient. Ugarit felt the full force of the Sea Peoples.
Not everyone was dead however and the city may have lingered on initially as a private letter to Carchemish was able to describe the dire situation: “When your messenger arrived, the army was humiliated and the city was sacked. Our food in the threshing floors was burnt and the vineyards were also destroyed. Our city is sacked. May you know it! May you know it!” (RS 19.011; Singer (1999) 726; Cline (2014) 151). “One of the great natural harbours of the Mediterranean was reduced to smouldering ruins.” (Wilkinson (2010) 351)
The vast number of tablets and other artefacts found in the ruins of Ugarit not only helps provide some of the political context and contacts of the city at the time of its destruction, they can also give something approaching an actual date of that destruction. Tablet RS 86.2230 contains a letter sent by a certain Egyptian called Bay to Ammurapi in his role as the Great Chancellor of the pharaoh Siptah (1197-1191BC). It was traditionally thought that Bay continued to serve Siptah’s successor, Queen Twosret, before being executed in 1190BC, marking a terminus ante quem not only for his letter to Ugarit but for the reign of Ammurabi and indeed perhaps the sack of Ugarit by the Sea Peoples.
However, two potsherd fragments (Ostraca IFAO 1864) indicate that Bay was executed as a traitor during the reign of Siptah, specifically either on or shortly before “Year 5, III Shemu day 27 of Siptah”. Deciphering Ancient Egyptian dates is by no means an accurate science, but it could be that the season of Shemu – ‘Low Water’ – equates to something like May to September, with ‘III Shemu’ perhaps being July, and ‘day 27’ being possibly around 12 July in the Gregorian calendar.
This would seem to place Bay’s death on or near perhaps 12 July 1192BC and therefore his letter to Ammurapi not after that date (despite mentioning the dating of Bay’s execution to the reign of Siptah, Kaniewski et al. (2011) still list 1190BC as the latest date for RS 86.2230).
A further narrowing down of the date range comes in the form of an astronomical observation made on another tablet found in the ruins of Ugarit. KTU 1.78/RS 12.061 records a solar eclipse, which has been dated to 21 January 1192BC (Dietrich and Loretz (2002)). This suggests that the final abandoning of Ugarit did not happen until after this date.
Could it be then that the sack of Ugarit by the Sea Peoples happened between 21 January and 12 July 1192BC? While being able to narrow such an event in ‘pre-history’ down to a less than 6-month period is appealing, there are considerable issues with not only the equating of Ancient Egyptian calendar dates with modern equivalents, an assumption is being made that this latter date “Year 5, III Shemu day 27 of Siptah” represents something of a terminus for the final destruction/abandonment of Ugarit
In reality, the sack of Ugarit by the Sea Peoples does not have to equate to its final abandonment. As already seen above, letters were still being sent by Ugarit inhabitants after its violent visitation by the Sea Peoples. Indeed, the limited dating has Ammurapi, king of Ugarit, living until 1180BC.
Whenever it happened, the story of the sack of Ugarit and its aftermath demonstrates the scale of the cataclysm that was overtaking the eastern Mediterranean world - Greece, Anatolia, Cyprus, Syria and Palestine all show signs of significant destruction. Around the same time as Ugarit was sacked, Hattusa, was abandoned as the capital of the mighty Hittite empire.
However, aspects of the same story show the interconnectedness of the eastern Mediterranean world even at such a relatively early period. There were alliances between various peoples, itself a significant change from just a century prior, particularly between the Hittites and Egyptians; something that proved to be a major strength but also ultimately a fatal weakness as seen with the Ugarite army being absent when their city came under attack. But even with that, such was the ferocity of the Sea People attack that even if the entire Ugarit army had been at home and had received aid from Carchemish and even Cyprus, it would seem to have been a futile gesture of resistance.
If the Hittites could not resist, doing so significantly undermined the New Kingdom of the Egyptians, and the Assyrians were only saved by their own extraordinary military might, what hope did an alliance of border towns between the three great empires of the time really have?
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