Camels and Cats on Cyprus?: The Revolt of Calocaerus

The fourth century may have played host to some Roman emperors of great stature - Diocletian, Constantine I and Theodosius I, but it also played host to numerous rebels and usurpers, some more famous and/or successful than others: Magnentius, Magnus Maximus, Eugenius and even technically Julian the Apostate, Maxentius, and Constantine himself.

However, there some much less successful or famous, whether they be Licinius’ co-emperors Valerius Valens and Martinianus, Julian’s cousin Marcellus, or the potential ‘loyalist’ usurper Poemenius.

Possibly even less well known (at least to me) is a short-lived usurper on the Eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus from AD334, late in the reign of Constantine I, called Calocaerus.

His origins are completely unknown, and much of what is recorded about him lacks detail and/or is tinged with legendary or anachronistic accounts.

Calocaerus is recorded as having held the position of magister pecoris camelorum, which is not a well-known or well used Roman title. Magister pecoris was more widely known as being the chief herdsman of a region, with some aspect of being a veterinarian, caring the animals under their care. Being essentially a leading shepherd on part of Cyprus seems like a very lowly, even servile, station from which someone could launch a usurpation that could take even brief control of the island.

The suggestion that Calocaerus was originally sent to Cyprus by Constantine as governor of the island, possibly to deal with the restoration of the island in the aftermath of the earthquake of 332/333, would likely indicate that he held a more high-ranking position that chief shepherd (although if the earthquake was particularly bad, a specialist in such animal husbandry and veterinary care may well have been needed).

It has been argued then that magister pecoris camelorum represents a military position like ‘captain of the camel corps’, and while there is no evidence of camels on Cyprus during this period, they had been known there as early as the Bronze Age (Hill (1940) I.244 n.1). It could also be that Calocaerus was captain of camel corps before he was sent to Cyprus, with it therefore highlighting something about where he was stationed - somewhere where a camel unit was situated - before being transfered to Cyprus in 334/334.

There is also suggestion that the Cypriots had asked Constantine to send them a captain governor and some forces to defend the island from raiders, with it then being Calocaerus who was dispatched and who former the military garrison and coastguard of Cyprus by importing men, specifically from Albania.

However, much of this appears anachronistic. It is very doubtful that any raiders were rampaging across the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean in the early 4th century. Such a militarising of Cyprus almost certainly belongs to the late 7th century/early 8th century with the advent of the Islamic threat on sea. There were likely some military colonies set up during this time made up of Mardaites, rather than Albanians, who were likely an even later import during the period of Venetian influence on the island (1489-1570).

However Calocaerus ended up on Cyprus and whatever he was doing there, at some point he became the focus of a revolt, possibly even a usurpation, by 334. Might Calocaerus’ actions in restoring the island have garnered enough local thanks for him to overestimate his position? Or could the revolt have been the idea of the locals with Calocaerus swept along against his will?

If Calocaerus was governor of the island then he already held power that could be turned into a revolt, but if he was something lower down - governor of a Cypriot region or even just a chief herdsman, then he would have to have succeeded in rallying the militia forces of his immediate vicinity in order to claim control of more of the island.

We do not have sufficient information from the sources to determine if Calocaerus had to do any fighting to claim his region or the island as a whole. Perhaps the alacrity of the imperial response could indicate that there was some contest amongst the Cypriots, with the loyalist side sending a call for aid to the mainland, a distress call that landed on the desk of Dalmatius, stationed in Antioch.

Some of the sources disagree which Dalmatius this was - the father who was the half-brother of Constantine and served as consul and censor, or his son who would soon be elevated to Caesar. For example, Theophanes, Chron. AM5825 states that it was Caesar Dalmatius, but then his reason for this appears to be that he did not know that there were two Dalmatii.

Dalmatius Caesar

The likelihood is that this was the elder Dalmatius the Censor who not only received word of the Cypriot rebellion but then also carried out, and possibly led, the imperial response. With forces likely detached from the burgeoning eastern field army, Dalmatius quickly forced her way onto Cyprus, possibly with the aid of any still active anti-Calocaerus loyalists, and defeated the rebel’s meagre forces in rapid order.

Calocaerus himself and likely some of his subordinates were captured and taken to Tarsus in Cilicia, where he was either tortured to death or burned alive (Aurelius Victor, de Caes. 41.11 vs Theophanes, Chron. AM5825). That Aurelius Victor states that Calocaerus “was tortured to death like a slave or robber” could actually mean that the defeated rebel was crucified. The revolt seemingly began and ended before 334 was out. It being so short and the source material lacking detail, you may think that there is not much more to say about the revolt of Calocaerus; however, that is not the case.

One thing that should always be asked about a Roman usurpation (if this truly was a usurpation)  - do any coins survive? So far, the answer is ‘no’. We might think that a lack of surviving coins means none were minted, but having coins created with his face and his usurped imperial title on them to spread news of his elevation and pay the troops that supported him will have been one of the first things Calocaerus did once he decided to rebel.

Even the alacrity of the imperial response would not be enough to prevent this. There are coins surviving from third century emperors who may have only ‘reigned’ for weeks or even days, with their coins making their way into the hands of legionaries who would then march over the empire, spreading (and dropping) these coins far beyond the area controlled by the usurper.

The lack of surviving coins of Calocaerus could reflect the island nature of Cyprus - a lack of resources, a small garrison and/or its relative isolation allowing Dalmatius to round up any usurpation propaganda and destroy it. Ultimately, the real reason for the lack of coins bearing Calocaerus’ face and imperial title could be that there was never any need of any because he did not actually usurp the imperial title.

This may seem like an insignificant rebellion, with no chance of any kind of sustained success - Aurelius Victor, de Caes. 41.11 considered Calocaerus’ revolt as insane. And while it had not survived its first real test, the revolt had required the intervention of a high-ranking member of the imperial family. This could suggest that local forces had either failed to defeat Calocaerus or had joined him. The latter might be more likely if part of Calocaerus’ mission to Cyprus had been to import/recruit a more permanent garrison on the island beyond militia forces.

There was another, perhaps much more dangerous, potential aspect to this revolt. In the process of investigating the circumstances of Calocaerus’ revolt, Dalmatius uncovered evidence of the involvement of an illegitimate son of the emperor Licinius, a former ally turned enemy of Constantine, who had been defeated in 324 and executed the following year.

The Licinii

This unnamed son (the lack of a recorded name would seem a reason to be cautious) had reputedly been legitimised by an edict and been allowed to survive Licinius’ downfall and demise, a demise that had taken a natural son, Licinius II, along with him.

This could add a dynastic element to this revolt, which could tap into any lingering Licinian support or anti-Constantinian feeling. Such an element, if it was known about before the defeat of Calocaerus, could explain the swift imperial action taken against it.

Of course, Dalmatius may have just been using the revolt of Calocaerus as a premise to get rid of a lingering thread from a previous threat to the Constantinian dynasty. Instead of ‘gathering’ evidence of this Licinian son’s involvement with Calocaerus, Dalmatius may have simply manufactured it for the political ends of the Constantinians. 

And if we are going to suggest that a son of Licinius was falsely implicated in this revolt, might we also suggest that Calocaerus could have been also falsely implicated in having imperial designs? One might claim that with all the different sources recording Calocaerus’ revolt, it would be impossible to completely reject their testimony. However, the historical record is by no means as secure and wide-ranging as it first appears.

The records of Jerome, the Anonymous Valesianus and Orosius are all not only short but similar, hinting at a shared original source. Aurelius Victor and Theophanes are vaguely similar in content and length, although as we have seen, they do contain conflicting reports on the mode of Calocaerus’ execution. There is enough of a dearth of information on the revolt to say that nothing we know about it is completely secure.

Ultimately though, it is fair to say that whatever its origins, this revolt/usurpation of Calocaerus never stood a chance, not just due to the lack of resources he had at hand on the island. Dalmatius and his commanders were ruthlessly efficient in their intervention, building upon any aid they received from Cypriot imperial loyalists, either in the form of intelligence or actual military help.

The defeat of Calocaerus provides a good example of the success of Roman counter-revolt. For centuries, it had been the Roman way to immediately take the offensive with whatever troops were available, rather than wait to gather more troops, which gave the rebels more time to prepare, predating the military dictum attributed to the 14th century Turco-Mongol conqueror, Timur the Great by over 1,500 years - “It is better to be on hand with ten men than absent with ten thousand”.

Addendum

Calocaerus’ time on Cyprus became connected to the legendary foundation of the monastery of St. Nicholas of the Cats at Akrotiri, near the salt lake of Limassol (Hill (1940) I.244). This legend has the island afflicted by a drought, possibly connected to the earthquake of 332/333, which led to a blight of venomous snakes, hindering the building of a monastery. The threat to the locals brought the interjection of Helena, mother of Constantine, who organised the importing of 1,000 cats from Persia and Egypt, with this feline regiment riding the island of its slithery menace.

The cats of Akrotiri survived various destructions and rebuildings of the monastery, creating the unofficial sub-breed known as the ‘Cyprus cat’; however, by 1983 when the monastery was given over to an order of nuns, the feline population had diminished, resulting in the return of their venomous foes. Following in Helena’s legendary footsteps, the nuns imported more cats from abroad and Cypriot strays to again contain the snakes.

Sources

Aurelius Victor, de Caes. 41.11

“suddenly Calocaerus, commander of the imperial cancel herd, insanely seized the island of Cyprus and pretended to rule. He was tortured to death like a slave or robber, as was right and proper”

Jerome, Chron. 334

“Calocerus revolts in Cyprus and is suppressed”

Origo 35

“Constantine also put down a certain Calocaerus, who tried to achieve a revolution in Cyprus”

Anon. Val. VI.35

“Constantine also put down a certain Calocaerus, who tried to achieve a revolution in Cyprus”

Orosius VII.28.30

“In Cyprus, he crushed a certain Calocaerus, who was plotting a revolution”

Theophanes, Chron. AM5825

“Kalokairos, the usurper on the island of Cyprus, did not resist the Roman attack. After being defeated, along with those responsible, he was executed by the Caesar Dalmatius at Tarsus in Cilicia by being burned alive”

Bibliography

Hill, G. A History of Cyprus. New York (1940)

Lenski, N. The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine. Cambridge (2006)

Mawdsley, H. ‘Defeat on Display: The Public Abuse of Usurpers and Rebels in Late Antiquity’, JLA 17 (2024) 35-69

Wardman, A. ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts in the 4th Century A.D.’, Historia 33 (1984) 220-237

Vagi, D. Coinage and History of the Roman Empire 82BC c. 82BC - AD 480. Chicago (2000).