The Real Severans Prelude - The Rank Usurper: Numerianus the Grammarian

With his forces having secured the defeat and then murder of the pretender Pescennius Niger through victories at Cyzicus, Nicaea and Issus and then personally annexing Osrhoene, by 196, Septimius Severus was preparing to deal with his erstwhile Caesar in the west, Clodius Albinus.

He had signalled that intent by proclaiming his eldest son, Caracalla, as his heir, contrary to a previous agreement made with Clodius in 193, upgrading the roads of northern Italy, having the Roman Senate declare Clodius a public enemy in December 195 and even having some of his diplomats attempt to assassinate Clodius.

In response, Clodius Albinus had himself declared Augustus and moved into Gaul, from where he gathered forces, along with his British legions and detachments from Spain. Using this army, Clodius occupied Lugdunum, defeated Virius Lupus, governor of Germania Inferior, and then besieged Trier; however, he was unable to claim Trier or most of the legionary forces on the Rhine.

Part of the reason for Clodius not being able to take control of the Upper Rhine or press on into northern Italy while Severus and his generals were still on the move west may have been due to the presence of a pro-Severan force acting in the Alpine border between Gaul and Italy.

This force, made up of men raised from northern Italy and southern Gaul and led by a senator called Numerianus, inflicted a check on a cavalry force of Clodius, which had been sent south either to reconnoitre the Alpine passes and /or to deal with this small band that was appropriating funds from Clodian territory. This initial victory of Numerianus and "other daring exploits" (Dio 76.5.1) saw him come to the attention of Severus as he arrived in Rome. Happy that a senator had taken such initiative, Severus wrote to Numerianus and encouraged him to expand his efforts by recruiting more men. The success he had had, plus this Severan writ, likely saw Numerianus able to quickly bolster his numbers by offering cash incentives from the booty his men had been gathering.

The subsequent increase in numbers and expansion of their scope of activity surely helped Numerianus achieve more "remarkable exhibitions of his prowess" (Dio 76.5.2) in the interests of the Severan cause. This in turn brought together a vast amount of cash, with Numerianus reputedly sending 70 million sesterces(!) to Severus in Rome (Dio 76.5.2). Given such a sum of money , Numerianus and his men did more than forestall a Clodian scouting party or two. They must have struck at Clodian columns, forts, towns and even cities, on top of the countryside in general, in southern Gaul.

The success of the Numeriani, both in strategic and financial terms, meant that in the aftermath of the Battle of Lugdunum, Numerianus was granted an audience with the sole ruler of the Roman Empire. We might be expecting that Numerianus received commendation for his actions in furthering the interests of the Severan cause.

Except there was a problem...

Numerianus was a usurper... twice over...

When raising his standard in northern Italy, Numerianus was actually pretending to be a senator. He was instead "a schoolmaster who taught children their letters" (Dio 76.5.1) in Rome... Furthermore, he claimed to have imperial permission to raise forces, when he did not.

We might even raise doubts over his initial Severan leanings - could he have been taking advantage of the period of civil strife that hand engulfed the Roman state since the assassination of Commodus on the last day of 192? Would we really be all that surprised if Numerianus' militia had been raiding territory that held to Severus as well as to Clodius? Might Severus' missive to Numerianus encouraging him to increase his force also have doubled as a warning about the direction of his raiding? It might be telling that Numerianus' "remarkable exhibitions" and sending of the large haul of sesterces came after Severus contacted him. Encouragement and threat can go a long way.

There is also the issue that while he may not have initially known that Numerianus was not a senator, Severus will have known from the moment he heard about Numerianus' actions that he had not given permission for him to raise a military force. This was a prerogative saved for those with permission expressed in their political office or from the emperor himself. Usurping rank and prerogative could easily have been fatal Numerianus.

It could well be that he saved himself from imperial retribution through his admitting to everything - his false claiming of rank and writ - and not asking for or even expecting reward. Indeed, it may even be that Numerianus was offered a promotion to the senatorial rank, with all the "great honours and wealth" (Dio 76.5.3) that came with it; however, he rejected this reward.

We might wonder what Severus might have done had Numerianus appeared before him expecting reward or had grasped the senatorial promotion that was dangled before him. As it was, Numerianus was allowed to retire peacefully to the countryside, "receiving a small allowance from the emperor for his daily needs" (Dio 76.5.3).

That Numerianus had built up this scratch force with only his own wits and a (false) claim to Severan writ is all the more impressive as his lack of senatorial background and his actual job as a school grammarian meant that he did not have a retinue of any size around him or the means to pay for the upkeep of a paramilitary force. These Numeriani will have had to win immediate success in order to sustain themselves and such need likely bred a daring and rapacious militia that caused local Clodian forces a real headache, draining its exchequer whilst filling that of Severus.

Numerianus and his pro-Severan militia is recorded by Cassius Dio, an active senator in the Severan period who could have had firsthand knowledge of the episode, but it is not recorded by either of the other main sources of the period - Herodian and Historia Augusta's biographies of Severus and Clodius. It is possible that the actions of Numerianus are lumped together with those of Virius Lupus and in Germania in what Herodian III.7.1 calls "minor skirmishes" in the run up to the Battle of Lugdunum. But has appear to be completely ignored by HA Sev. 11.7 and Clod.Alb. 9.1, which only relate the initial Clodian victories over the Severans, invoking the capture of Lugdunum and defeat of Virius Lupus without naming them.

Bibliography

Birley, A.R. Septimius Severus: The African Emperor. London (1999)

Graham, A.J. ‘The Numbers at Lugdunum’, Historia 27 (1978) 625-630