The (Brief) Gothic Takeover of Constantinople III: Demilitarisation and Debarbarisation?

The Gothic sack of Rome in 410 was undoubtedly a traumatic event for those involved and a major psychological blow to the Empire as a whole, but it was lacking in long-term effects. In comparison, the Constantinopolitan takeover of Gainas, along with the rebellion of Tribigild, was more prolonged and could be said to have had more identifiable consequences for the Eastern Roman Empire beyond the symbolic. Indeed, the powerplays of both Tribigild and Gainas were simultaneously the result of and considerable influences on Eastern Roman military policy.

Perhaps the basis for these Gothic powerplays was the “centralised civilian bureaucracy controlled by the emperor and his advisers at Constantinople” (Liebeschuetz (1990a) 93) that had emerged during the reign of Theodosius I and then eastern opposition to Stilicho’s claim of regency over Arcadius. This civilian control provoked conflict with the military, with the latter viewed as a threat to civilian authority, “expensive to maintain, and impossible to keep up to strength without resort to the recruiting of unreliable barbarians” (Liebeschuetz (1990a) 94). In a bid to lessen this threat, eastern leaders “were ready to risk military weakness if in this way they could avoid the danger to internal stability of a large army and successful generals” (Liebeschuetz (1990a) 127).

Essentially, the civilian authority in Constantinople was choosing low-intensity warfare, which relied as much upon static defences as it did the deployment of large forces, a choice that may have been initially thrust upon them by the absence of the main eastern field army in the west having gone there with Theodosius to deal with the usurpation of Eugenius. Stilicho had been dragging his feet in returning the eastern army back to Constantinople (and when it did return it had got involved in imperial politics by murdering Rufinus, proving at least some of the civilian worry correct).

Pitched battles were to be avoided as they were an unpredictable drain on manpower. Bribery and diplomacy were to be the new defensive weapons, while any wars were to be fought through sieges and skirmishes. Such a strategy required relatively few soldiers. The success in using financial power to neutralise potential threats encouraged Constantinople to continue this strategy. This lessened the civilian dependency upon the army and the threat to their political dominance.

However, so fully did the civilian authorities commit to this low-intensity defence that the imperial army may have been significantly weakened, while also fuelling potential internal trouble with inaction, reduced rewards and increased obstructions to advancement rankling with the military leadership (Claudian, In Eutrop. II.178), in particular the foederati who relied more on bonuses and booty than regular troops.

These downsides seem to have come together to create and perpetuate the revolt of Tribigild. Not only was he put out by a lack of reward for his previous imperial service and his Ostrogoths possibly annoyed at a lack of action and pay, the weakness of the imperial army, even at the heart of the empire, may have enabled his initial successes. Worse still, other foederati forces in the army of Leo may have defected due to similar complaints over imperial service. This may also hint at how much reliance the reduced imperial army had on such barbarian foederati – once some of them defected, the remaining regular units were undermanned. These defections and ‘limited demilitarisation’ left the imperial army unable to defeat Tribigild and then having to rely, admittedly successfully, on a small force under Fravitta and the imperial navy to confront Gainas (Socrates VI.6).

However, it should be noted that the incidents of Tribigild and Gainas did not solely highlight the negatives of ‘limited demilitarisation’. One aspect of the low-intensity warfare strategy – using hard point defences – worked to ensure the eventual defeat of Gainas by preventing him from gathering supplies in Thrace, forcing his retreat further north towards the Danube, where he was killed by the Huns of Uldin (Zosimus V.19.6-7, 20-21).

The same tension between the eastern government and the military that led to the adopting of low-intensity warfare helped unleash some latent anti-barbarianism among the eastern ruling classes following the rebellion of Tribigild and the ‘tyranny of Gainas’ (Synesius, De Prov. 1245D-1247A). It is worth remembering that it was the eastern army that had been defeated at Adrianople in 378 and required the injection of Gothic recruits from Theodosius’ foedus ‘treaty’ of 382. Therefore, it is possible that any complaints of the eastern army being flooded with barbarians may have had some foundation.

In terms of leadership, there was a deliberate effort to keep Germans from powerful positions in the army. During this period the majority of eastern generals had Greek or Latin names. While this is not surprising as the number of foreigners holding Roman command was less than a third throughout the fourth century, in the east, with the removal of some Goths, it seems to have dropped to around a fifth (Elton (1996a), 148 Table 4, 273 Table 7). Constantinople also appears to have helped prevent integration by maintaining the distinctiveness and inferiority of barbarians. Non-Roman officers did not necessarily become citizens and the prohibition of intermarriage between gentiles and Romans (CTh III.13.14[370]) was enforced. Even a successful general such as Fravitta had to ask for special dispensation from the emperor to marry a Roman (Eunapius fr.60; Zosimus IV.56-57). There may even have been an attempt to maintain the legions as strictly for Roman citizens only, with non-citizen barbarians serving in foederati units. As the fifth century progressed, the majority of ‘barbarians’ that the east did use were from Armenia and Isauria, longstanding inhabitants of the Empire and were therefore only barbarians in the loosest terms.

There was no real attempt to fill the gap left by the move away from barbarian soldiers and as a result the army was allowed to further decline in numbers. The most striking example of this was the defeat of the Sciri as not only were they were not enrolled in the army or settled for future recruiting, they were specifically exempted from having to provide recruits (CTh V.6.3[409]; Sozomen IX.5.2-7). However, there was a limited remilitarisation following the death of Arcadius in 408, which saw the sending of troops to Italy and Africa and a minor conflict with the Persians necessitated the employment of more barbarians in important military positions. Plinthas the Goth served as magister militum praesentalis for over twenty years and as consul in 419 (Marcellinus Comes s.a. 418; Socrates V.23; Sozomen VII.17), while Ardaburius the Alan commanded the army against Persia in 421 (Socrates VII.18.20; Priscus fr.20; Evagrius II.1), defeated the western usurper Ioannes with his son Aspar (Olympiodorus fr.43) and served as consul in 429. That these men of barbarian origin were experienced enough to be appointed to high commands suggests that they had considerable Roman service behind them. This in turn shows that even during the period of ‘debarbarisation’ the eastern army still employed non-Romans (Liebeschuetz (1990a), 130).

Therefore, despite its anti-barbarian stance, the eastern government’s response to Tribigild and Gainas was marked by pragmatism even from the very outset. There was no indiscriminate killing of barbarians, with only the supporters of Gainas targeted. This was a sensible approach for there were still large numbers of barbarians in the army that had remained loyal to the Empire. It would have been potentially fatal to chastise Franks, Sarmatians, Huns, Isaurians, Armenians and other Goths for the folly of the followers of Tribigild and Gainas. The appointment of Fravitta to the command against Gainas, and the likelihood that the meagre forces he brought to bear on the rebels at the Hellespont contained non-Romans, further demonstrates this pragmatism.

Even the treatment of prominent Goths or pro-Goth politicians in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Gainas is marked less by brutal, blanket anti-barbarian recrimination and more by individual circumstances. The seeming leader of the pro-Gothic camp, Caesarius, did find himself accused of treason in 401, but not only was he allowed a trial, he was acquitted. Sure, this acquittal may have come about because of his family ties to Aurelianus, who had returned from exile, but if the imperial government had been on an anti-Gothic rampage, Caesarius would surely have faced harsher treatment.

A Goth who does seem to have faced overly harsh treatment in the aftermath for the defeat of Gainas was the man largely responsible for that defeat: Fravitta. Either late in 401 or a couple of years later in 404, he was put on trial and executed for treason, supposedly because he had allowed Gainas to escape after his victory at the Hellespont. This is usually seen as an extreme measure in the context of the anti-German hatred that reigned after the debacle of the Goths. It probably did not help Fravitta’s cause in the face of imperial authorities that he was a Hellenic pagan and had attributed his victory to the intervention of the ancient gods. Being a Goth on top of that paganism could have been the basis of his trial and execution. Indeed, that a certain Hierax, a followed of John Chrysostom, may have organised Fravitta’s execution might add to the religious dimension of Fravitta’s demise.

However, Fravitta’s paganism and Gothic origins had not prevented him from being charged with dealing with Gainas (which he achieved!), being rewarded with the consulship of 401 and possibly a triumphal celebration in the capital, but once Constantinople had been swept up in anti-Gothic sentiment (however briefly), thoughts of gratitude towards Fravitta were quickly overcome. It may be that rather than be attacked for his religion, origins or actions against Gainas in a brief whirlwind of anti-German feeling, Fravitta fell afoul of court politics by accusing a favourite of the empress Eudoxia of sowing discord between the imperial brothers, Arcadius and Honorius.

Coming full circle in this three-part blog, there was another Goth who may have been affected by any wave of anti-Gothic sentiment in Constantinople, with dire consequences for another imperial capital... Alaric. The rebellion of Tribigild and the ‘tyranny of Gainas’ may have affected the treatment of Alaric by the eastern government, possibly leading to his removal as magister militum per Illyricum, departure from Epirus, invasion from Italy and ultimately his Sack of Rome a decade later.

The defeat of Gainas may have not only had an influence on Eastern Roman military policy, but also on the make up of the Gothic contingent in dealings with the Eastern Empire. The death of Gainas may mark an end to the relatively pluralistic Gothic tribal development with independent warbands: “thereafter only two ethnogeneses were possible: that of the Roman Goths within the empire and that of the Hunnic Goths at its doorstep” (Wolfram (1988) 135).

Bibliography

Elton H. Warfare in Roman Europe AD350-425. Oxford (1996a)

Elton, H. ‘Fravitta and Barbarian Career Opportunities in Constantinople’, Medieval Prosopography 17 (1996) 95-106.

Liebeschuetz J.H.W.G. Barbarians and Bishops: Army, Church, and State in the Age of Arcadius and Chrysostom. Oxford (1990)

Matthews J. Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court AD 364-425. Oxford (1975).

Vedeshkin, M.A. ‘“A Barbarian by Birth, Yet a Hellene in Everything Else”: The Image of a Pious Barbarian in the Works of Late Roman Pagans’, Ancient Civilizations from Scythia to Siberia 26 (2020) 425-436.

Wolfram H. History of the Goths. Berkley (1988).