The (Brief) Gothic Takeover of Constantinople II: The ‘Tyranny of Gainas’

It seems then that there was some potential background to the accusation that Gainas and Tribigild were in cahoots. And even if Gainas was not directly involved in aiding and abetting Tribigild as a plot against Eutropius (who they both disliked, with Tribigild supposedly having been rejected in a petition he put to Eutropius – Claudian, In Eutr. II.176ff., 320-321), his actions in the field do appear somewhat suspect or at least counter-productive. Gainas was appointed joint commander with Leo to deal with Tribigild, with orders to guard Thrace and the Hellespont (Zosimus V.14.1), leaving the inexperienced and possibly incompetent Leo in command of the campaign. Some of the forces sent by Gainas to aid Leo actually attacking Leo’s column instead also looks suspicious, with it possible that Gainas was looking to remove a rival due to growing rumours of an anti-Gothic conspiracy. However, this could be just an example of two ill-disciplined groups of soldiers in close proximity in the heightened atmosphere of a battle zone where raiders were active and supplies were to be shared.

Gainas’ reputed inactivity upon his taking on of sole control of the campaign against Tribigild and crossing to Asia Minor also seems suspicious; however, rather than doing nothing and even secretly encouraging Tribigild (Zosimus V.15.3ff), inactivity may have been an intentional anti-Tribigild action, as the rebel had been having significant trouble with the local militia of Valentinus. By not giving the rebel Ostrogoths an obvious imperial target, Gainas may have been exposing them to on-going militia counterattacks and restricting their own large-scale successes, ultimately limiting the size and duration of their revolt.

However, any doubts over Gainas being in alliance with Tribigild from the very beginning would seem to be quashed by how quickly Gainas manipulated the situation in his dealings with Arcadius, having various political opponents removed, and how quickly the two Gothic commanders came to terms in the wake of Leo’s demise. That said, both of these developments could have taken place after Gainas surveyed the situation after crossing to Asia Minor. An experienced general may have felt that further warfare with Tribigild would be unnecessarily detrimental to Asia Minor and Roman manpower, particularly if there was a diplomatic solution to be found.

After his period of inactivity, Gainas appealed directly to Arcadius, claiming that he could not defeat Tribigild until certain conditions were met, primarily the dismissal of Eutropius (cf. Zosimus V.17.3-5). Arcadius accepted Gainas’ exaggerated pleas, having Eutropius dismissed from his position and deprived of his rank. And when Eutropius sought sanctuary in a church, imperial officials had his forcibly dragged out and exiled to Cyprus (Zosimus V.18.1-2). However, Gainas manipulated Arcadius, aided by other members of the imperial court, into having Eutropius executed at Chalcedon before the year 399 was out. That said, that other court officials, particularly those privy to the terms of Eutropius’ removal from sanctuary and banishment, may have intentionally misstated those terms to the emperor to facilitate Eutropius’ definitive removal, could indicate that Eutropius found himself targeted by both the pro-Gothic and Hellenist parties in the imperial court.

With his conditions met, Gainas then used whatever connection he had with Tribigild to bring the rebel to terms. Following his reverses at the hands of Valentinus and facing a more skilled general than Leo, it could well be that Tribigild was eager to make peace and with the empire (in the guise of an Arcadius-backed Gainas) willing to offer that peace for whatever reason (preserving/reintegrating manpower or a political plot), he may have jumped at the chance to re-enter imperial service.

It seems that Gainas and Tribigild had some kind of meeting in or near Pamphylia to thrash out the terms of the former’s rehabilitation or the acknowledgement of their any pre-existing alliance between the two. They both then head back towards Constantinople along the same route through Lydia and Phrygia, although not at the same time (Zosimus V.18.4).

Initially, events appear to have played out like an imperial army leading a rehabilitated rebel back towards the imperial capital. But when the two armies met up at Thyatira, Tribigild expressed regret that he had not sacked and plundered Sardis, with Gainas seemingly agreeing to return there with him to capture it. Only the onset of poor weather prevented the two Gothic leaders from making good on their treasonous assault on a Roman provincial capital (Zosimus V.18.5).

So thwarted, Gainas and Tribigild looked elsewhere for their succour: the former headed north into Bithynia, while the latter headed west towards the Hellespont, both allowing their barbarian followers to plunder the countryside as they went. Tribigild took control of Lampsacus, while Gainas took up residence in Chalcedon. From such a position of strength and even threat to the very heart of the Eastern Roman Empire, Gainas ‘invited’ Arcadius to meet with him in Chalcedon to settle matters (Zosimus V.18.5).

That Arcadius acquiesced to such a summons surely reflected the threat that Gainas and Tribigild were thought to pose. Certainly, the agreement that Gainas was able to extract from the emperor during their meeting seems like an imperial capitulation to a strong opponent. Although it may reflect the personal weakness of Arcadius himself and justify Gainas’ wish to have a face-to-face meeting with the emperor in the Church of St. Euphemia.

The agreement saw Gainas appointed magister utriusque militae (Sozomen VIII.4.5; Socrates VI.6.1; Theodoret, HE V.32.1; Theodoret, HE V.32.6 also suggests he was granted the status of an ex-consul), a similar position to that of Stilicho in the west. With his new-found authority and imperial influence, Gainas secured the transfer of his army and that of Tribigild from Asia to Thrace, a position that would allow them to influence and intervene in Constantinopolitan politics, as well as take command of the approaches to the capital and likely the defence of the Danube frontier. Gainas also ‘persuaded’ the emperor to hand over several high-ranking individuals (supposedly the leaders of the anti-Gothic party) to him, including the current consul Aurelianus, a former consul in Saturninus, and a certain John, a close advisor of Arcadius, so close that it was rumoured that John was the lover of the empress Aelia Eudoxia and even the father of the future Theodosius II (Zosimus V.18.8-9; Philostorgius XI.8). While it would be presumed that Gainas would have executed these political enemies, it seems that he only exiled them.

Might it have been expected that Tribigild would have received an obvious promotion too? There is no record of any such reward, although that does not mean that it did not happen. It could be argued that Gainas may have felt that trying to achieve a promotion for a man who had rebelled against the empire would not reflect well on him. However, if the Goths of Gainas and Tribigild were going to be entrusted with defending the approaches to Constantinople, we could suggest that Tribigild might have been promoted to magister militum per Thracias, a position that the exiled former consul Saturninus had previously held.

Part of the reason for the sources not giving any detail on the position of Tribigild after the ‘agreement’ at Chalcedon is that he does not seem to have long survived it. Philostorgius XI.8 merely states “he died not very long” after crossing to Thrace, with Wolfram (1988) 149 suggesting that he died in fighting in Thrace.

Even though there is no mention of who Tribigild might have been fighting, there are really only three options...

1) Raiding barbarians

While there were Huns active along the Danube (as we shall soon see), surely the sources would have recorded a barbarian raid as deep into Roman territory as the Thracian approaches to Constantinople.

2) Loyalist imperials forces

The advent of Gainas to political power in Constantinople was not well-received, so it would not be surprising for his co-conspirator to face similar opposition from the anti-Gainas forces in Constantinople or from loyalist forces in Thrace – might Tribigild have found himself facing opposition from the Thracian field army when he tried to take command of it?

3) Gainas

In the air of conspiracy surrounding the revolt of Tribigild and the role Gainas may have played in it, the demise of Tribigild at such a crucial point as perhaps the Gothic advance on Constantinople may be seen as suspicious. Perhaps Gainas took the opportunity to remove someone he could not depend on, a challenger to his command of the Goths and a rebel against the central government Gainas now intended to control. But then, even if Gainas viewed his fellow Goth and his revolt as merely a means to an ends (Wolfram (1988) 149) and now a political liability, removing him at such a juncture or even at all would have been a poor move on the part of Gainas.

Despite imposing something of a ‘tyranny’ on Constantinople between March and July 400, circumstances were to quickly prove that Gainas lacked allies. The sheer fact that Tribigild might have died in fighting in Thrace demonstrates that there was no universal acceptance of Gainas’ accession to political power in and around Constantinople.

And it seems that Gainas himself recognised that issue. While he was able to take up residence in Constantinople, it would appear that he did not feel safe and/or had plans to secure more control over the city.

While he resided at Constantinople, he distributed his soldiers into several quarters; depriving the city even of the court-guards. He gave the barbarians private instructions, when they saw that the soldiers were departed from the city, immediately to attack it, being now destitute of all protection, and to deliver the sole authority into his hands (Zosimus V.18).

However, even as he tightened his military grip on the capital, Gainas proved that while he may have been able to win political power, he quickly proved that he was not able to wield it in a consolidatory fashion.

Unsurprisingly, as a barbarian general, he lacked political connections in the imperial court and foisting his power upon the emperor and his officials was not going to engender any positive change to that relationship, with the imperial court ready to take advantage of any misstep.

And one of those missteps appears to have come in the realm of religion. Gainas was an Arian Christian, and quite a zealous one it seems. From his position of relative strength, he tried to obtain a church for use for the Arians, but was prevented of John Chrysostom rousing the opposition of the people (Socrates VI.5.8; Sozomen VIII.4.6-10; Theodoret, HE V.32.2-8; Photius, Bibl. 96; Synesius, de prov. 116B). Gainas then compounded his missteps by trying to seize the money of bankers (Sozomen VIII.4.11; John of Antioch fr.190) to pay his men and bribe others. Finally, he made an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the imperial palace (Sozomen VIII.4.11-13; John of Antioch fr. 190).

With these political, military and religious missteps, it is perhaps not surprising that Gainas did not feel confident enough to remain in the capital, retiring to a villa some 40 stadia away and to pray in the Arian Church of St. John near Hebdomon. Zosimus V.19.2 claimed that this provided an opportunity for a slow creep of increasing control within the walls of Constantinople from Gainas’ Gothic forces, which could have made Gainas and his men supreme at the centre of imperial power.

However, Gainas’ own natural barbarian impatience (Zosimus V.19.2) saw him march back to the city before the internal takeover was complete. This meant that when Gainas appeared before the walls, loyalist guards sounded the alarm, rousing the remaining loyalist garrison and the general populace in defence of the city. This rag-tag militia and garrison succeeded in neutralising the barbarians already in Constantinople and then repulsed Gainas’ attempts to force entry into the city (Zosimus V.19.3). It may even be that the citizens of Constantinople launched a pre-emptive attack on the Goths in the city. However it came about, the Goths inside the city were defeated, taking refuge in Hagia Sophia, while those with Gainas failed to gain entry. Arcadius later ordered the Goths seeking sanctuary to be massacred. The supposed number of 7,000 Goths being killed seems far-fetched; furthermore, that these 7,000 Goths were suggested as only a fifth of Gainas’ total strength (Synesius, De Prov. II.2) could be exaggeration or that the 35,000 included women and children (Albert (1984), 131 n.184; Synesius, De Prov II.1; Sozomen, HE VIII.4.15).

That said, such numbers would certainly explain why Zosimus may have thought that the Gothic takeover was only a matter of time if Gainas had been patient (Zosimus V.19.1-5; Sozomen VIII.4.14-17; Marcellinus Comes s.a. 399; John of Antioch fr. 190). These number could also be questioned by Gainas’ plan to attack the walls of Constantinople (Zosimus V.19.4) for why would he need to do so if there were already 7,000 men in the city? This could be explained by the idea that Gainas had made a colossal blunder by leaving the city.

Defeated and with overtures to Arcadius thwarted by John Chrysostom, Gainas managed to flee from under the walls of Constantinople into Thrace. But when he met local resistance, he moved to the Hellespont, looking to lead his men back across to Asia Minor, possibly to meet up with the remaining Ostrogoths in Pamphylia.

However, as his force was trying to cross the Hellespont on improvised boats, an imperial army appeared. Demonstrating that any pro- and anti-Gothic division in Constantinople was not strictly nationalist, this imperial army, raised from the garrison and militia of the capital, and supported by part of the imperial navy, was commanded by a certain Flavius Fravitta, another Romanised Goth promoted to magister militum per Orientem. Taken by surprise, Gainas’ force was heavily defeated (Zosimus V.19.6-21.4; Sozomen VIII.4.18-20; John of Antioch fr. 190; Eunapius fr.82).

Even with this latest defeat, Gainas himself survived and escape north, crossing a well-defended Thrace, which denied him supplies (Zosimus V.19.6-7), possibly heading for some of the Gothic settlements close to the Danube. However, he found that area increasingly under the sway of the Huns of Uldin, who will not have wanted another Gothic-led presence to set up along the Lower Danube and become a focus of defection for the Gothic manpower already under his control. After several battles throughout the last weeks of 400, Gainas was defeated and killed on 23 December, his head sent to Constantinople as a diplomatic gift to Arcadius (Zosimus V.21.9-22.2; Sozomen VIII.4.20; Marcellinus Comes s.a.400, 401; John of Antioch fr.190; Wolfram (1988) 150).

The victory over Gainas was celebrated with splendid events, the dedication of the Column of Arcadius, which was decorated with reliefs of the battle against Gainas, the minting of coins with the legend CONCORDIA AUG – ‘concord of the Augusti’, and the writing of speeches by Synesius (the Egyptian Tale/On Providence and On Imperial Rule); however, while it was ultimately defeated and was unlikely to have had any aim to overthrow Arcadius, “the Gainas-Tribigild revolt was a scandal of the first order” (Wolfram (1988) 150), particularly if Gainas and Tribigild, much like Alaric, were heavily Romanised. Might we even question how ‘Gothic’ the forces Gainas used to take control of Constantinople really were? Tribigild’s rebels may have been mostly (although not completely) Ostrogothic, but then they did not necessarily take part in the takeover of the capital, seemingly moving into Thrace through the Hellespont. As Gainas was one of two generals, along with Leo, charged with leading the imperial response to the revolt of Tribigild, his forces are likely to have been made up of praesental Roman forces (Zosimus V.22.9) and not the ‘barbarians’ that the likes of Zosimus would try to present them as (Zosimus V.17.1, 18.1, 19.1).

However, Gainas did encourage Goths settled in Thrace and Phrygia to enrol in his army (Zosimus V.21.9; Socrates VI.6; Sozomen VIII.8.1), and may have undertaken a massacre many of his Roman followers, suggesting that he could not rely on their loyalty once he was ousted from Constantinople and declared a public enemy.

But any such Romanisation of the main antagonists or the Roman basis of the imperial forces used by Gainas did not prevent the Eastern Roman government from using the incidents to alter its military and barbarian policies…