Roman Ideology on Warfare: The Background to Recruitment IV: Keeping Up Unrealistic Appearances

Little had changed with regard to Rome’s perceptions of those outside their empire by the fourth century. The army remained positioned on the frontiers, while the field armies could easily be used in an assault into enemy territory. More importantly, the emperors remained offensive-minded. Constantine was supposedly filled with Alexandrian dreams of conquest before his death (John Lydus, De Mag III.34), while Julian had similar ambitions (Julian, Caes 333a). Archaeological evidence suggests that the army maintained its presence along both banks of the Rhine and Danube (Ammianus XVII.1.11; XVII.10.4; XIX.6.2; XX.10.2; Whittaker (1994), 203; Lee (2007), 70). Valens’ sorties across the Danube were not just punitive raids but overt attempts to establish a military reputation for himself. This suggests that the traditional Augustan psyche of an offensive Empire was still very much in tact. Even prolonged fighting with belligerent peoples such as the Goths, Franks and Alamanni did little to relax the Roman superiority complex. Many of the attitudes fostered during imperial expansion had hardened into stereotypes (Whittaker (1994), 196). This combination of arrogance and ignorance is highlighted by numerous instances of the Romans underestimating the threat posed by their neighbours (Goths – Ammianus XXII.7.8; Quadi – Ammianus XIX.6.11; Sarmatians – Ammianus XVII.12.2; Saracens – Ammianus XIV.4.1; XXIII.3.8; Julian, Or. 1.21B; Germans – Velleius II.117; Prudentius, C. Symm. II.816-19). No emperor could admit that Roman territory had been lost with regions such as Dacia and the Agri Decumates still viewed as part of the Roman state despite being occupied by barbarians.

Perhaps due to ill-advised belligerence and the ad hoc reforms of individual emperors, by the late fourth century there was trouble on the frontiers (Ammianus XXVI.4.5-6; Themistius, Or. VIII; Anonymous, De rebus bellicis 20; however, most of the negativity of the sources regarding “chaos and pessimism, while Rome cowered behind its defences” (Whittaker (1994), 195) was a result of the shock of Adrianople). Expedience saw more barbarians settling in Empire as well as serving in the field armies and along the frontiers. However, while this could be beneficial for Rome, she lost the ability to impose her will upon these non-Romans with alarming rapidity. Alaric’s Visigoths raided the Balkans and threatened Italy. The Frankish defenders of northern Gaul gradually became its de facto rulers and Britain was conquered by Jutes, Angles and Saxons. Theodosius’ leading of a band of 500 horsemen to find a barbarian spy near Salonica (Zosimus IV.48). highlights the state to which the frontiers had fallen and that trouble could only be faced “through undercover piecemeal action and through banditry” (Ammianus XXXI.7.2). The Notitia Dignitatum suggests that on paper there was a difference between defensive auxilia, equites and cohortes and offensive cunei and other auxiliaries, suggesting that Rome still hoped to be offensive. However, by the early fifth century such an arrangement was a mere pipe dream (Whittaker (1994), 203). While Honorius and Stilicho were praised for imposing laws on the Chauci and Suebi (Claudian, In Eutrop. I.378-84; De cons. Stil. I.218-31), this can only have been a token gesture for the Rhine frontier had to be stripped of almost all of its men to defend Italy.  Reliance on others to protect the frontiers is shown by the mass migration of the Vandals, Alans and Suebi in 405. Once these peoples defeated the Franks, they were free to roam across Gaul almost unhindered.

The proposed solutions to this crisis bring the repercussions of strategic thought on recruitment squarely into view. “A continuous line of castella, situated every one thousand Roman feet, linked by a solid wall and with strong watchtowers” (Anonymous, De rebus bellicis 20) surrounding the entire Empire would have been a colossal undertaking, requiring well over 1,000 fortresses along the 4,000 kilometres of the Rhine-Danube frontier alone. Even the most modest of garrisons in each of these forts would have stretched the manpower resources of the Empire to their limit. A combination of harsh conscription of citizens and employment of barbarians might have provided enough soldiers but would have left the local and praesental field armies severely undermanned. So while fortifications and soldiers were placed in the limes during the fourth century, there was no attempt to surround the Empire in impenetrable walls. This suggests that they were never heavily militarised or innately defensive. The inherent ambiguity of limes and ripa show that the idea of a fixed military or political frontier was never strong. What changed was the extent to which the aims in and beyond the limes were achieved and how far the claims to control corresponded to reality (Whittaker (1994), 202).

In the simplest terms Rome aimed to push her frontiers as far as possible through military or diplomatic conquest. Despite there being no new foreign acquisitions post-Severus, the Roman policy of offence and punitive raids into enemy territory was retained. Emperors were not only expected to send campaigns against enemies of the Empire but they were expected to lead the army in person. To that end most of the army was still placed along the frontiers, while the comitatenses could be used as a strike force. Diplomatic domination was still sought after and forts were placed in barbarian territory, supplemented by the network of roads throughout the frontier zones. It was perhaps these arteries of communication and transport that were the essential element of Roman frontier strategy (Luttwak (1976), 60). However, if the Romans understood the subtleties of an overarching strategy they kept quiet about it (Isaac (1992), 376). Therefore, despite the initiation of war usually being based on rational considerations (Campbell (1984), 133, 382), it is unlikely that Rome’s frontiers were ever chosen specifically or a particular campaign launched to establish a defendable position (Isaac (1992), 387, 416). Rome expanded where she could, not where she should (Isaac (1992), 416) and the decision was never taken to halt further expansion. The frontiers that arose at geographic positions “arose by default” (Mann (1974), 513) rather than design.

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