The Achaemenid Persian Empire was perhaps the first superpower of the ancient world, establishing its ‘King of Kings’ as an immensely powerful individual. However, in the process of creating their empire, the Persians also established a series of powerful governors – satraps – in various provinces.
One such powerful man was Oroetes (or Oroetus), satrap of Lydia during the 520s BC. He may have been the first official satrap of Lydia after the region was incorporated fully into the Persian Empire late in the reign of Cyrus the Great. The region was brought under Persian control through the military campaigns of Cyrus’ Median general, Harpagus, who may have served briefly as satrap of all of Asia Minor before it was broken up into smaller, more manageable and less dangerous provinces.
The lack of clarity over the dates of Oroetes’ service as Lydian satrap makes it somewhat unclear if he was an appointee of Cyrus the Great or Cambyses I. However, Herodotus III.120 suggests that Oroetes was established in the post of “viceroy of Sardis” by Cyrus, which would suggest that Oroetes was appointed in 530BC – the year of Cyrus’ death – at the latest.
Does the timing of Oroetes’ appointment suggest that he was part of the Persian army of Harpagus that subdued Asia Minor? Could that in turn suggest similar Middle Eastern origins – such as Cyrus’ Persia or Harpagus’ Media – for Oroetes? Herodotus III.120 suggests that Oroetes was a Persian, but could this be a more general description of his allegiance to the Persian state rather than his actual origins? Could it be that he was a local Lydian, Carian or Greek who found himself in Persian service? Unfortunately, the sources or his recorded actions do not give much in the way of information beyond inferences which are ambiguous about where he might have come from.
During his time as Lydian satrap, Oroetes was involved in two major episodes - his bringing about of the crucifixon of Polycrates of Samos and his becoming the first satrap to demonstrate overt insubordination even revolt against the Persian central government, leading to his own murder.
The involvement of the Lydian satrap and perhaps the Persian Empire itself - it can be unclear just how much freedom of action many satraps had - with the demise of Polycrates is likely tied to the increasing power the Samian tyrant could wield in the Aegean Sea due to his building of a significant fleet [ harnessing the power of the trireme? ] and a skilled force of 1,000 archers. Indeed, Polycrates had become influential enough through his naval power to form an alliance with the Egyptian pharaoh, Amasis II [Carty (2005) 131-135 suggests that Polycrates provided the pharaoh with ships and manpower for the Egyptian conquest of Cyprus].
Later sources also played up the power of the Samos under Polycrates, with Herodotus III.122 considering Polycrates the first Greek ruler to recognise the potential of sea power, while Thucydides I.13.6 lists him amongst the Aegean thalassocracies.
Such power and influence not only on their Aegean frontier but being projected east into lands such as Cyprus and Egypt, which the Persians had their acquisitive eyes on, would explain why the Persians thought it necessary to perhaps do away with Polycrates.
While the origin of a Persian move against Polycrates is likely then to have been worry over his growing power, Herodotus III.120 records two possible sparks for action against Polycrates - an accidental or intentional snub of an ambassador sent by Oroetes to Polycrates (Herodotus III.121) or a squabble between Oroetes and Mitrobates, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.
During a conversation between the two, Mitrobates goaded Oroetes over his failure to conquer it for the Persian king… “You are not to be accounted a man; the island of Samos lies close to your province, yet you have not added it to the King's dominion - an island so easy to conquer that some native of it [Polycrates] rose against his rulers with fifteen men-at-arms, and is now lord of it” (Herodotus III.120.2-3).
Herodotus is either demonstrating that Mitrobates (and many others?) knew about how Polycrates took over Samos, or he is using something he has already established in his narrative (Herodotus III.39) to add a plausible point of insult to his satrapal conversation.
Herodotus also suggests that while Oroetes was “angered by the taunt” (Herodotus III.120), he was less keen to attack his taunter (for now...) and more anxious to deal with Polycrates, suggesting that Mitrobates had definitely struck a nerve: Oroetes himself may have thought that he had under-performed in his dealings with the Samian tyrant.
Whatever the exact circumstances, Oroetes began to plot against Polycrates. The failure of a Samian rebellion against Polycrates, possibly facilitated by Persian backing, in the mid-520s BC, may have encouraged the Lydian satrap to look to less military and more deceptive means.
Oroetes appealed to Polycrates as a potential ally should the Persian king ever turn against his satrap. He offered Polycrates a substantial amount of money in return for a promise of refuge on Samos for Oroetes. Not only was there the financial incentive, Polycrates would have been intrigued by the potential of having a Persian satrap as an ally, while is asking for refuge Oroetes was also flattering the Samian tyrant as the satrap was inferring that Polycrates and his navy could keep Oroetes safe even in the face of the might of the Persian king.
Oroetes was likely counting on Polycrates’ want for further expansion of his influence in the Aegean and Ionia and could well have played into the rivalry with Mitrobates as proof of Oroetes' need for help outside the Persian Empire.
It may well be queried if Oroetes had a potential ulterior motive in reaching out to Polycrates... could the notion of alliance with Samos have been less of a smokescreen than usually thought? Might Oroetes have been hedging his bets - establishing an avenue of contact with the Samian tyrant either to bring about his fall or to actually become his ally. There may be more truth in his supposed deception of Polycrates than might be thought.
“Oroetes addresses Polycrates as follows: I find that you aim at great things, but that you have not sufficient money for your purpose. Do then as I direct, and you will succeed yourself and will save me. King Cambyses aims at my death; of this I have clear intelligence. [4] Now if you will transport me and my money, you may take some yourself and let me keep the rest; thus you shall have wealth enough to rule all Hellas. If you mistrust what I tell you about the money, send someone who is most trusted by you and I will prove it to him.” (Herodotus III.122.3-4)
Polycrates did not jump in feet first at this invitation. Before agreeing to a meeting with Oroetes, he dispatched a compatriot of his, Maeandrius, to the court of the satrap to investigate the sincerity of Oroetes’ offer and perhaps more specifically, whether or not the satrap could provide the kind of wealth he had promised to the Samian tyrant.
The short answer was that Oroetes did not have such wealth, but he put on a good show of having such fabulous wealth, filling “eight chests with stones, leaving only a very shallow space at the top; then he laid gold on top of the stones, locked the chests, and kept them ready. Maeandrius came and saw, and brought word back to his master.” (Herodotus III.123)
At least partially convinced by Oroetes’ story and promises, Polycrates decided to accept this invitation for a face-to-face meeting at Magnesia, the residence of the Lydian satrap. This was completely against the advice of his diviners and various friends, who thought he was walking into a trap. The most evocative attempted dissuasion of Polycrates came from his daughter. She claimed to have had a dream where she saw her father hanging in the air, his body being washed by Zeus and anointed by Helios (Herodotus III.124.1). The tyrant brushed off the doomsayers, even threatening his daughter with refusing to let her marry once he returned from Magnesia. His daughter replied that she would rather remained unmarried throughout her life than lose her father… (Herodotus III.124.2)
Of course, Polycrates should have listened. It was a trap. The Samian tyrant was not to return home to prevent any future nuptials for his daughter…
It is not completely clear how Polycrates died from Herodotus’ account: “he was horribly murdered in a way unworthy of him… in some way not fit to be told” (Herodotus III.125.2, 3). This might suggest that the actual method of his death was either suitably inglorious – like a quick slitting of the throat by a lowly soldier or slave – or horribly gruesome like being impaled.
Whatever was the mode of Polycrates’ death, Oroetes then had his dead body subjected to crucifixion, perhaps to provide a warning to other leaders in the region. It was in this crucified position that the death of Polycrates has become a popular artistic scene, even if it was not the actual method of his death.
It was also seen by Herodotus as the fulfilling the prophetic dream of Polycrates’ daughter: the crucified position being the ‘hanging in the air’; the ‘washing by Zeus’ being the rain that fell on him in the open and the ‘anointing by Helios’ being the sweat on his body from the exertion and heat of sun (Herodotus III.125.4).
After achieving the assassination of Polycrates (paving the way for the Persian conquest of Samos in c.525BC), Oroetes then turned his attention back to the internal issues of the Persian state. The death of Cambyses in 522BC (either through an accidental wound or assassination) led to significant trouble at the heart of the Persian Empire, with his younger brother Bardiya (or someone impersonating him) briefly succeeding him as ‘King of Kings’ only to then to be then overthrown in favour of Darius I.
In the confusion surrounding the Persian kingship, Oroetes appears to have offered little help to any of the sides vying for control. Being so distant from the centre of Persian power, it might not have been expected that the Lydian satrap would have gotten directly involved in internal disputes; however, Oroetes certainly did something to catch the attention of Darius I once he was established on the Persian throne.
Rather than stay quiet during the succession crisis of 522BC, Oroetes seems to have used the disruption it caused to further his own agendas of personal vengeance and expansion of his power. The target for both of these agendas was his taunter and satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Mitrobates.
Oroetes is said to have orchestrated the assassination not only of Mitrobates but also his son, Cranaspes, adding Hellespontine Phrygia and possibly Ionia to his own Lydian territory in the process (Herodotus III.126.2).
To this list of refusal to help in the Persian succession crisis, satrapal murder and usurpation, Oroetes then added what would be considered outright treasonous murder.
Darius I, seemingly just before he acceded to the Persian throne, sent a messenger to the Lydian satrap. Exactly what that message was is not recorded, but Herodotus suggests that it displeased the Lydian satrap. Could it be that Darius had warned Oroetes that he had to pick a side in the on-going succession trouble, forcing the satrap into forfeiting his beneficial neutrality? Herodotus III.127.2 has Darius claim that the messenger he sent to Oroetes was to recall him to court, presumably for trial or execution for his role in the deaths of Mitrobates and Cranaspes.
It might also be suggested that Oroetes feared what the messenger would say to Darius. Had he heard of Oroetes’ murders and usurpation? Could it even be that Oroetes was using this Persian succession crisis to orchestrate his own secession from the Persian Empire?
Whatever his motivation, Oroetes is said to have decided to do away with Darius’ messenger. Setting an ambush for the messenger on his way back east to report to Darius, the Lydian satrap had the messenger murdered, his body and horse hidden away.
Even with the intercepting and silencing of the messenger, Darius got word of the various murders, usurpation and defiance of Oroetes and decided to act against him (Herodotus III.127.1).
However, he felt that opening marching against the rebellious satrap would not be the best option. Darius was not yet well-established on the throne and suddenly marching to the western frontier of his realm might have encouraged some of his opponents to try to overthrow him. Furthermore, Oroetes had the forces of two full satrapies, including a loyal guard of 1,000 Persian spearmen, and likely some Ionian Greek allies to defend himself with (Herodotus III.127.1). Military victory would not necessarily be assured for the newly-enthroned ‘King of Kings’.
Darius therefore decided to employ subterfuge. He called together a large assembly of leading Persians at his court and asked…
“Persians, which of you will promise to do this for me, not with force and numbers, but by cunning? Where there is need for cunning, force has no business. [3] So then, which of you would either bring me Oroetes alive or kill him? For he has done the Persians no good, but much harm; he has destroyed two of us, Mitrobates and his son, and is killing my messengers that are sent to recall him, displaying an insolence that is not to be borne. So, then, before he does the Persians some still greater harm, he has to be punished by us with death.”
Herodotus III.127.2-3
Such was Darius’ rousing speech calling for defenders of the Persian realm from this rebellious satrap, he had 30 men volunteering to undertake the plot to remove Oroetes. Rather than leave them to choose between themselves or having to choose himself, potentially sparking the enmity of the others, Darius had the 30 volunteers draw lots – via this method, the choice fell on the prominent Persian nobleman, Bagaeus, son of Artontes (Herodotus III.128.1).
Duly tasked by Fate and Darius to deal with Oroetes, Bagaeus set about this duty through a series of letters, all stamped with the seal of the King of Kings. With them, he travelled to Sardis and obtained a meeting with Oroetes.
Before the satrap and a gathering of his spearmen, Bagaeus took out the first letter and gave it to the satrapal scribe to read aloud. It is not entirely clear from Herodotus’ recording what the first letter was supposed to have said, but it seems to have appealed to the loyalty of the spearmen, perhaps through flattery and making it clear that the letters were from Darius himself, without actually intimating that Darius felt that Oroetes was a threat to the Persian realm.
Satisfied that the contents of the first letter had had the desired effect, without revealing the true aims of this epistolary series, Bagaeus then had the second royal letter read out to the spearmen. This one had a more overt order within it, which the Lydian satrap must have recognised as a threat to his power.
“Persians! King Darius forbids you to be Oroetes’ guard.” (Herodotus III.128.4)
Having been suitably flattered and/or reminded of their loyalty to the Persian king, the spearmen now obeyed the letter, lowering their spears in the face of Bagaeus’ royal writ.
Before Oroetes could so anything about the growing undermining of his position, Bagaeus then moved on to the third letter. It contained the definitive test of the loyalty of the Persian spearmen…
“King Darius instructs the Persians in Sardis to kill Oroetes.” (Herodotus III.128.5)
Bagaeus must have realised that his own life was on the line here too, for if he had read the reaction of the spearmen incorrectly, the order to kill the satrap might have led to his own grizzly murder and ultimately the full usurpation of the Lydian, Phrygian and Ionia provinces, backed by some Greek forces. At a time when the reign of Darius I was not yet fully secure, a mass revolt in western Asia Minor may well have seen other recently conquered territories – Egypt, Cyprus, Libya – break out in rebellion, possibly threatening the cohesion of the central Persian provinces.
However, Bagaeus had been correct in his reading of the satrapal court at Sardis. Upon the reading out of this royal demand to murderous action, the Persian spearmen drew their swords and attacked Oroetes, killing him almost instantly.
Herodotus III.128.5 considered this wretched demise of Oroetes just recompense for the end he had subjected Polycrates to.
Bagaeus then succeeded the vanquished Oroetes as Lydian satrap, bringing the region back in line with the Persian government of Darius. He then shipped off a large number of possessions of Oroetes to Darius at Susa as something of a tribute or even booty from a defeated foe (Herodotus III.129.1) Amongst these possessions were a number of slaves that Oroetes had taken from Polycrates, namely the non-Samian members of the entourage that had travelled with the tyrant to his fateful meeting at Magnesia, including a certain Democedes of Croton, who would make a name (and a fortune) for himself in treating the Persian king for a broken ankle (Herodotus III.129-132).
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